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Revenge on Revenge Porn: International 
Approaches to Protecting Privacy Rights 
January 2, 2019 
by Mary Kate O’Connell 
Under Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the privacy of individuals is protected from interference and 
attacks. However, the advent and evolution of the internet has created new ways for users to 
violate privacy that are difficult to regulate and prevent. One such modern privacy violation 
is revenge porn, which can be broadly defined as the distribution of sexually graphic images of 
individuals without their consent. 
As access to the internet has provided individuals with the ability to search and share information 
quickly and easily, revenge porn has become a mechanism used by abusers and harassers to 
diminish their victim’s privacy. The three major forms of revenge porn include Nonconsensual 
Pornography, which can be defined as the distribution of private, sexually explicit images of 
individuals without their consent; Recorded Sexual Assault, which involves using the image or 
video capture of a sexual assault– typically by a rapist– to further humiliate a victim and/or 
discourage them from reporting the crime; and Sextortion, which is the act of threatening to 
expose a nude or sexually explicit image in order to get a person to do something such as share 
more nude or sexually explicit images, pay someone money, or perform sexual acts. 
While several countries have been successful in criminalizing revenge porn, criminalization has 
required legislators to balance the human right to freedom of expression with the human right to 
privacy. Both of these basic human rights are governed by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. In order to craft effective strategies to 
punish distributors of revenge porn, countries have had to be creative in ensuring such strategies 
do not unintentionally infringe on the right to freedom of expression. As discussed below, 
international approaches to protecting individuals from revenge porn have included defining it as 
a breach of civil law under defamation and including it as part of existing sexual violence 
statutes. While these approaches have been comprehensive, they have almost all led to conflicts 
with existing country protections of the right to freedom of expression. 
Last November, Senator Kamala Harris introduced the ENOUGH Act, or the Ending 
Nonconsensual Online User Graphic Harassment Act of 2017. The goal of this act is to amend 
Title 18 of the United States Code to include a provision that would make it a federal crime to 
“knowingly distribute a private, visual depiction of an individual’s intimate parts or of an 
individual engaging in sexually explicit conduct, with reckless disregard for the individual’s lack 
of consent to the distribution, and for other purposes.” A vote is likely to occur soon on the 
ENOUGH Act once the Senate Committee on the Judiciary completes the markup process. The 
potential effectiveness of the ENOUGH Act can be analyzed through a critique of international 
legal approaches to combating revenge porn. 
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In the United Kingdom, a law was passed in 2015 to criminalize all forms of revenge porn. 
Within the first six months of the law being enacted, 175 cases of revenge porn were reported, 
but very few people were convicted of the crime. The sentencing for convictions of revenge porn 
under the UK law imposes a maximum sentence of two years in prison with no additional fines 
or required protections for the victim. Criminalization of revenge porn in the UK illustrates the 
negative aspects of the idealistic view that proponents of criminalization hold. While 
criminalization may increase reporting of revenge porn, it creates difficulties in punishing 
distributors of revenge porn since evidence for the criminal trials are often scarce. Additionally, 
the relatively low maximum sentence for those convicted of revenge porn does little to address 
the legal needs of victims. Without the ability to recover damages due to the law being a criminal 
statute, the victim is likely unable to receive monetary relief for the harm caused, which may 
have required them to take expensive measures to further protect their privacy. In terms of free 
speech, the law provides exceptions for journalistic material, but nonetheless it has 
been criticized by organizations such as English PEN and Article 19, who argue that the law 
criminalizing revenge porn is too broad and requires more exceptions for artistic expression. 
In Iceland, revenge porn has not been criminalized, but distributors of revenge porn are 
prosecuted under Iceland’s Tort Act, which includes decency and defamation clauses. An 
example of the effectiveness of this approach is demonstrated in a case regarding 
the conviction of a 19-year-old for distributing naked pictures of his ex-girlfriend online without 
her consent. In this case, the distributor of revenge porn was required to pay his victim $1,800 in 
damages. By allowing victims of revenge porn to recover damages, Iceland’s approach to 
combating revenge porn provides both a deterrent for distributors to commit further acts of 
revenge porn, while also providing victims with reparations for the harm caused. However, 
without a possible prison sentence, some distributors of revenge porn may not view the possible 
$1,800 in damages as a deterrence. Revenge porn is a malicious act, and unfortunately, many 
distributors could view the benefit of revenge as outweighing the high monetary punishment. In 
comparison to the United Kingdom, Iceland’s efforts to combat revenge porn have not 
encountered as much criticism from free speech activists. This is likely due to how Iceland 
classified the act as a tort, but it could also be a result of the Icelandic popular opinion that 
censorship is beneficial, as evidenced by Iceland’s proposition of a law to ban all online 
pornography. 
Currently, in the United States, forty states and the District of Columbia have laws 
criminalizing revenge porn, but the passage of the ENOUGH act would make the distribution of 
revenge porn a federal crime. The possible effects of the passage of the ENOUGH act can also 
be predicted by looking at similar state-level laws prohibiting revenge porn. For example, 
in New Jersey, revenge porn acts are criminalized as acts of harassment and distributors of 
revenge porn are prosecuted as harassers. The criminalization of revenge porn in New Jersey has 
made it easier for victims of the horrific crime to be granted restraining orders against their 
abusers/harassers. This criminalization in New Jersey has also extended the scope of such 
restraining orders by requiring the abuser/harasser to remove all images/videos of their victim 
from the internet. Additionally, someone found guilty of revenge porn under New Jersey’s law is 
ordered to pay a fine of up to $30,000 and can be sentenced to three to five years in prison. With 
this combination approach to sentencing, New Jersey’s law is effective in achieving a balance 
between deterrence, rehabilitation, and justice for the victim when it comes to punishing 
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perpetrators of revenge porn. No lawsuits have been filed yet regarding the New Jersey law, but 
similar laws in Arizona and Texas have been at the center of lawsuits the extent to whether the 
laws are unconstitutional because they infringe on the first amendment right to free speech. 
While the ineffectiveness of the UK and Icelandic approaches to combating revenge porn 
provide a negative view of criminalizing or reclassifying the horrific act, the effectiveness of 
New Jersey’s law criminalizing revenge porn gives an optimistic outlook to the possible impact 
of the ENOUGH act, if passed. Harassers, abusers, and distributors would be deterred by the 
monetary fine and rehabilitated by the possible jail sentence, and victims of revenge porn would 
be able to receive both monetary reparations for and protection from harm. 
However, the approaches in Iceland and the United Kingdom to combating revenge porn make 
clear that the implementation of revenge porn laws, whether criminal or civil, often does not lead 
to predicted or desired results. Effective revenge porn legislation must protect the rights to both 
privacy and the freedom of expression, and it must be able to address the ever-evolving cyber 
means to distribute revenge porn. Lawmakers should keep in mind that privacy is essential to 
free speech, and that the right to privacy applies equally to all. Privacy, just like freedom of 














U.S. Refugee Resettlement: Presidential 
Authority and Congressional Oversight 
 
February 25, 2019 
by Betsy L. Fisher[1] 
Introduction 
Each year the President issues a Presidential Determination (PD) setting the number of refugees 
to be admitted to the United States in the upcoming fiscal year,[2] a decision that news coverage 
has widely discussed in recent years.[3] President Obama, seeking to demonstrate U.S. 
leadership in the Syrian refugee crisis, sought to resettle at least 10,000 Syrian refugees in Fiscal 
Year 2016 and established a PD of 110,000 refugees for Fiscal Year 2017—then a twenty-two-
year high.[4] In one of President Trump’s first official acts after his inauguration, he ordered the 
PD for Fiscal Year 2017 to be lowered to 50,000 before issuing consecutive, all-time low refugee 
PDs of 45,000 for Fiscal Year 2018 and 30,000 for Fiscal Year 2019.[5] 
Historically, advocates paid less attention to the process by which the PD for refugee 
resettlement is set. Congress established this process in the Refugee Act of 1980 and, despite 
many complaints,[6] Congress has not amended the process since.[7] While the 1980 Refugee 
Act has advanced legislators’ goals of facilitating longer-term policy making and planning for 
refugee resettlement,[8] the Act does not provide for refugee resettlement to continue if a PD is 
not issued prior to the start of a fiscal year. The consequences for an Administration failing to 
comply with the procedural requirements set out in the Act are borne not by the Administration, 
but by refugees who are waiting for resettlement. 
This article examines those procedural requirements and proposals for legislative reform, 
proceeding in three parts following this introduction. Part II addresses the anomalous procedural 
requirements of the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), whose annual 
admissions number is set by the President in consultation with Congress. Part III discusses the 
shortcomings of the current statutory structure, namely the failure to provide for continued 
resettlement in the absence of a Presidential Determination. Part IV evaluates legislative 
proposals for reform and the extent to which they would address this shortcoming. 
Background Information: Congressional Consultation Requirements in the Presidential 
Determination Process 
Congress has extensive authority over who can be admitted to, removed from, and naturalized in 
the United States.[9] As a result, Congress sets the numbers of authorized admissions for most 
immigration programs in advance, allowing either a predetermined number of visas for each 
category each year, or allowing visa issuances to as many individuals who qualify.[10] 
By contrast, the 1980 Refugee Act established the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and 
delegated to the President the decision of how many refugees to admit each year.[11] In setting 
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up this structure, legislators sought to establish equality in treatment of various groups of 
refugees, and to allow an Administration to establish longer-term refugee policy rather than 
addressing refugee situations on an ad hoc basis.[12] Yet, Congress did not blindly assign the PD 
to the President without reserving an oversight role for itself:[13] the refugee ceiling for each 
fiscal year “shall be such number as the President determines, before the beginning of the fiscal 
year and after appropriate consultation [with Congress], is justified by humanitarian concerns or 
is otherwise in the national interest.”[14] 
The 1980 Refugee Act sets out a multi-step process for setting the PD and appropriate 
consultation. First, prior to the start of the fiscal year, the President is to submit information to 
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees on the number of refugees in need of resettlement, 
and the President’s “anticipated allocation of refugee admissions.”[15] The Administration is 
expected to provide a list of information to Congress “[t]o the extent possible . . . at least two 
weeks in advance of discussions in person by designated representatives of the President with 
such members.”[16] This information essentially requires the President to provide a rough draft 
of the PD and an explanation to Congress as to how the President reached this preliminary 
decision. In practice, administrations have satisfied this requirement by publishing a document 
called “Proposed Refugee Admissions” for the upcoming fiscal year.[17] 
The next step is to hold “appropriate consultations,” defined as “discussions in person by 
designated Cabinet-level representatives of the President” with House and Senate Judiciary 
Committee members about the information provided by the Administration and to additionally 
inform Congress of the global refugee situation, impact of refugee resettlement on the United 
States, and other information.[18] The statute imposes a “consultation” requirement, not a 
reporting or briefing requirement, indicating an intent that Judiciary committee members should 
have the opportunity to state their opinions with the possibility of influencing the final PD rather 
than just to receive information passively. However, the Act does not describe how the 
Administration is to receive or weigh input from the Committee members during or after the 
consultations.[19] 
“As soon as possible” after these consultations are initiated, the Judiciary Committee members 
are to print “the substance” of the consultation in the Congressional Record.[20] Prior to issuing 
a final determination, Congress is to hold a hearing unless there are safety concerns preventing a 
public hearing.[21] Only after these steps are followed is the President to finalize the 
determination. All of these steps are to occur prior to the start of the fiscal year.[22] The 
Presidential Determination can be increased to allow for greater refugee admissions in the fiscal 
year if 
the President determines, after appropriate consultation, that (1) an unforeseen emergency 
refugee situation exists, (2) the admission of certain refugees in response to the emergency 
refugee situation is justified by grave humanitarian concerns or is otherwise in the national 
interest, and (3) the admission to the United States of these refugees cannot be accomplished 
under [the Presidential Determination issued prior to the start of the fiscal year].[23] 
Legal Analysis: Shortcomings of Current Consultation Requirements 
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While the 1980 Refugee Act sets out a roadmap for issuing the annual Presidential 
Determination, the statute’s primary challenge is the lack of means for refugee admissions in a 
new fiscal year until the President issues a PD. Most of the requirements listed above are 
mandatory, which is to say that Congress has stated that the President or Administration “shall” 
carry out these statutes. When an Administration is unwilling to carry out statutory requirements, 
though, the statute does not specify a means for Congress to force the Administration to comply. 
The clearest consequence of failing to carry out these procedures is that the U.S. Refugee 
Admissions Program is unable to admit refugees until the President issues a PD. 
Perhaps, since Congress does not have tools to enforce the procedural requirements of the Act, 
Administrations regularly ignore the procedural requirements in several respects. The statute is 
clear that the Presidential Determination “shall” be set prior to the start of the fiscal year; in 
several years, though, the PD was issued after the start of the fiscal year.[24] A hearing is 
required, but no such hearing was held any time in Fiscal Year 2018. The statute is unambiguous 
that consultations should be “in person” and with Cabinet-level representatives of the President. 
The consultations for Fiscal Year 2019 were held over video-teleconference.[25] Congress 
clearly intended that consultations provide an opportunity for Congress to provide meaningful 
input; members of Congress have complained in recent years that the consultations are pro forma 
“discussions” held only after a final decision is made.[26] The content of the consultations are to 
be published in the Congressional Record, but, perhaps because they are not public proceedings, 
the consultations have not been published in the Congressional Record for several years. 
These issues came to a head in the consultation processes for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019, both 
of which elicited strong responses from Judiciary Committee members. In August 2018, after 
expressing frustration with the Fiscal Year 2018 process, the Senate Judiciary Chairman and 
Ranking Member wrote to administration officials to begin the process of scheduling 
consultations.[27] Still, the Fiscal Year 2019 consultations process started only after Secretary of 
State Mike Pompeo had already announced number of refugees to be resettled, forcing a State 
Department spokesperson to clarify that Congress would, in fact, be consulted before the PD was 
finalized.[28] Those consultations were held over video-teleconferencing and after the start of 
the fiscal year.[29] 
Nearly four decades after the enactment of the 1980 Refugee Act, Congress should amend the 
Act to address a situation in which the President does not follow statutory requirements for 
congressional consultation and does not issue a PD prior to the start of a fiscal year. Several bills 
since 1980 have proposed amendments to the process. None of the bills have been enacted; two 
would address this statutory shortcoming, and one presents a viable legislative solution. 
The Refugee Resettlement Extension Act of 1988[30] would have required the initial report’s 
submission to Congress no later than June 1st.[31] The House and Senate Judiciary Committees, 
rather than the President, would then be responsible for moving forward with the remaining steps 
in the consultations process.[32] This would do little to remedy the situation of the last two years 
in which the President has simply delayed consultations and held only superficial consultations. 
It also does not state what should happen in the absence of a Presidential Determination at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. 
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The Refugee Program Integrity Restoration Act of 2016 would limit Presidential authority by 
setting a default Presidential Determination of 60,000—significantly lower than the historical 
average—and requires congressional approval for a Presidential Determination to be set above 
this level.[33] This bill would limit the need for consultations and allow for admissions without a 
Presidential Determination. However, its cap of 60,000 is artificially low, particularly when 
compared with historical averages,[34] and indeed, other provisions of the bill show that the 
legislation is clearly intended to limit refugee resettlement rather than to improve the 
resettlement process.[35] 
The Refugee Protection Act of 2016 would have adjusted the consultation process by allowing 
refugee admissions to continue if the President did not issue a Presidential Determination.[36] It 
would also require the President to initiate consultations by May 30 of the preceding fiscal 
year.[37] By requiring consultations to begin earlier, it would have increased the likelihood that 
consultations would be held and that the PD would be issued prior to the beginning of the fiscal 
year. It thus would have strengthened the arrangement of congressional and executive 
collaboration without fundamentally reallocating authority. Crucially, it would have allowed 
refugee resettlement to continue without a PD and without arbitrarily curbing refugee 
resettlement as the Refugee Program Integrity Restoration Act would do. The Refugee Protection 
Act’s PD provisions have one primary weakness: they peg ongoing arrivals in the absence of a 
PD to the previous year’s PD. The PD has varied from 110,000 to 30,000 in the span of the last 
three fiscal years, demonstrating the wisdom of pegging refugee admissions without a PD to a 
broader historical average. Nonetheless, the Refugee Protection Act provides the strongest of the 
three legislative proposals. 
Conclusion 
The Refugee Act of 1980 has been a remarkable success, but its procedural requirements have a 
key flaw: the punishment for an Administration’s noncompliance is inflicted on refugees who are 
waiting for resettlement. Congress should amend the Refugee Act so that refugees can continue 
to access refugee resettlement if the President fails to issue a Presidential Determination. 
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Mexico: The New Holding Cell for the United 
States 
 
February 26, 2019 
by Victoria Kadous 
 
On January 29, 2019, the United States took the first action in its plan to send non-Mexican 
asylum seekers back to Mexico while waiting for their asylum hearings as per the new Migrant 
Protection Protocols (MPP) policy. The first migrant returned to wait in Mexico under this plan 
was Honduran and since then the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers returned to 
Mexico are from Central America. MPP was passed in response to the severe backlog of asylum 
cases in the United States and a general skepticism of the validity of asylum claims. Currently, it 
can take several years for an asylum case to come before an immigration judge. Additionally, 
the Trump administration does not believe that many of the asylum claims are valid. The 
migrants are being sent back through the Tijuana port of entry currently but use of other ports is 
expected in the near future. About twenty migrants are expected to be returned to Mexico every 
day. 
Mexico has agreed to accept the asylum seekers for the time being unless they have health 
problems, are unaccompanied minors, or would be in danger in Mexico. Advocates have spoken 
out against sending asylum seekers back to Mexico though, claiming the country is unsafe for 
migrants who are regularly kidnapped by criminal gangs and smugglers. A lawsuit filed by rights 
groups on February 14, 2019, alleges that being forced to wait in Mexico is almost as 
dangerous as remaining in some parts of Central America, because of increased risks of 
“kidnapping, disappearance, trafficking, sexual assault and murder, among other harms.” In 
addition to possible danger in Mexico, advocates have argued that migrants sent back to Mexico 
would not have easy access to their legal counsel in the United States, making the process for 
seeking asylum more difficult. 
The actions of the United States are contrary to its human rights obligations under the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951 Refugee Convention), later codified in 8 USC § 1158; and the International 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). Under Article 
14 of the UDHR, “[e]veryone has the right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from 
persecution.” Under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the principle of non-
refoulement prohibits a state from returning a refugee to a situation where his or her life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground. This Convention was later 
codified, making it domestic law. Title 8, Section 1158 of the U.S. Code states that the only time 
an asylum seeker may be sent to a third country is when “the alien’s life or freedom would not be 
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion, and where the alien would have access to a full and fair procedure for 
determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary protection.” Further, under Article 5(a) of 
the ICERD, there is a guaranteed right to not be discriminated against due to nationality or ethnic 
origin when appearing in front of tribunals and all other organs administering justice. 
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By refusing to allow certain asylum seekers to remain in the country, the United States is 
violating Article 14 of the UDHR. Based on reports of the violence in Mexico, the United States 
is violating obligations under Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention and 8 USC § 1158 by 
sending asylum seekers to Mexico rather than allowing them to remain in the United States 
throughout the asylum process. Further, the rampant discrimination based on nationality under 
this protocol violates Article 5 of the ICERD. This is because under the MPP, only asylum 
seekers at the Mexican border and only asylum seekers who are not Mexican citizens will be 
held in Mexico. This discrimination is based on nationality of asylum seekers and serves to 
deprive them of equal access to asylum seeker services within the United States. By being held 
in Mexico, asylum seekers have a harder time meeting with United States lawyers and are being 
forced to make their cases under more dangerous conditions than other asylum seekers entering 
the United States. 
While there are clearly increasing asylum seeker backlogs in the court system, the practical 
deprivation of attorney services to a select group of asylum seekers kept in another country will 
not serve to fix this issue as much as place an undue burden and risk on those seeking asylum. 
The U.S. government has multiple obligations under both international and domestic law that 
prohibit it from sending asylum seekers to another country simply because they are from Central 
America. If the U.S. government wants to avoid costly litigation, it should bring the MPP in line 













Another Assault on Indigenous Land: The 
Battle Against the British Columbia Pipeline 
 
March 12, 2019 
by Shelsea Ramirez 
 
The hereditary chiefs of the Wet’suwet’en Clans of British Columbia are protesting the British 
Columbia pipeline that is being built by the TransCanada subsidiary company Coastal GasLink. 
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in British Columbia are carrying out an interim 
injunction from the British Columbia Supreme Court issued in mid-December 2018. The 
decision allows the company to begin pre-construction of a 416-mile pipeline that will cross the 
traditional territory of the Wet’suwet’en Clan. TransCanada claims to have permission from all 
twenty of the elected councils representing the First Nations of British Columbia for the entirety 
of the project, but demonstrators argue that the project is moving forward despite the outcry from 
the hereditary leaders of the Wet’suwet’en Clans. By moving forward with the British Columbia 
pipeline, the TransCanada company is violating a 1997 Canadian Supreme Court 
decision, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, which protects the existing aboriginal rights and title 
to land in the territory. 
The First Nations of British Columbia have a distinct political and legal system that predates 
colonization, with both hereditary chiefs and band councils speaking on behalf of the 
community. Hereditary chief is a title passed down through families, and the hereditary chiefs’ 
roles are largely viewed as protecting the territory and the interest of the people. The 
Wet’suwet’en hereditary chief structure is made up of five clans and thirteen houses. Band 
councils, on the other hand, are a form of elected governance introduced by the Canadian 
government through the Indian Act of 1976. The representatives on band councils are subject to 
elections held every two years. The band councils’ roles differ in each clan, although they are 
largely seen as administrators between the federal government and the First Nations. The New 
York Times reports, “A spokeswoman for Coastal GasLink, Jacquelynn Benson, said in an email 
that the company respects both leadership systems and has held 120 meetings with Wet’suwet’en 
hereditary chiefs since 2012, as well as logging 1,300 phone calls and emails with them, trying to 
reach a solution” because the hereditary chiefs have opposed the pipeline for years. 
In the Delgamuukw case, the Supreme Court upheld Indigenous peoples’ claims to lands that 
were never ceded by treaty. The Court affirmed that section 35 of the 1982 Constitution Act of 
Canada protects “Aboriginal title” as an “existing aboriginal right,” and this includes the right to 
exclusive use and occupation of land in a manner consistent with the group’s attachment to the 
land. Further, the Court implemented a three-part test to determine if the indigenous nations 
demonstrated Aboriginal title. The indigenous nations had to prove sufficient, continuous and 
exclusive evidence of territorial occupation. Although claims to the land were recognized, the 
Court never distinguished which of the two indigenous nations involved in the case, Gitxsan and 
Wet’suwet’sen, had title to the land where the pipeline is being protested. Although the 
indigenous nations chose not to move forward with another court case to determine the issue, it 
remains an issue between the First Nations. 
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By moving forward with the pipeline without the consent of the hereditary leaders of the 
Wet’suwet’en people, the TransCanada Company and effectively the Canadian government are 
blatantly disregarding the Wet’suwet’en people’s governance structure, undermining the rights 
of the indigenous people, and extinguishing any claim they might have on the land. They are also 
violating the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) Article 18, which 
states that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters 
which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in accordance with 
their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own indigenous decision-making 
institutions,” and Article 19, which requires states to consult and cooperate in good faith with 
indigenous peoples through their own representative institutions to receive free, prior and 
informed consent before adopting and implementing administrative or legislative measures that 
may affect the indigenous people. It should be noted that Canada initially voted against the 
adoption of the declaration in 2007; however, Canada has since removed its objector status and 
officially adopted UNDRIP. Although it is not a legally binding instrument under international 
law, the government of British Columbia also promised to uphold the articles in UNDRIP. 
A separate reconciliation process is underway between the Wet’suwet’en people’s hereditary 
chiefs and the Canadian government to discuss title, rights, laws, and traditional governance. It is 
not directly linked to the pipeline project, but it will open necessary doors to include the 
hereditary leaders in decisions regarding the territory. There continues to be an ongoing 
case where the interim injunction originated, and the case is expected to be heard in court by 
May at the latest. If Canada and the local British Columbian governments intend to stand by their 













Struggling to Survive: The Devastating 
Impact of the Minas Gerais Dam Collapse on 
Indigenous Populations in Brazil 
 
April 12, 2019 
by Victoria Kadous 
 
On January 25, 2019, a Brazilian dam collapsed, killing hundreds of people in the Brazilian state 
of Minas Gerais. The dam was owned by a Brazilian company, Vale SA, and was designed to 
hold back iron ore waste. The collapse flooded the small southeastern city of Brumadinho along 
with multiple Vale buildings. In the days following the collapse, multiple search parties looked 
for missing persons and surveyors found dead fish and trash over ten miles away from the mine 
collapse in the Paraopeba River. 
Coverage of the January 25 tragedy focused on how this was not the first time Vale has had to 
answer for a deadly dam failure. In 2015, another one of the Vale dams in Minas Gerais broke, 
killed nineteen people, caused hundreds to be relocated, and left 250,000 residents without 
drinking water. The most recent dam collapse has led to a re-evaluation of the circumstances 
surrounding the 2015 dam collapse and concern for the stability of the six hundred other dams in 
Minas Gerais which have been deemed at risk of rupture. 
In addition to the growing number of deaths from the dam collapse, the lasting effects of the 
collapse are threatening the survival of indigenous communities. In particular, the Pataxó 
indigenous group lives along the Paraopeda River and use it to bathe, fish, and water plants. 
These communities have been told to refrain indefinitely from using the contaminated river 
water. 
Discriminatory placement of hazardous waste disposal sites near lower income populations is a 
current problem in other nations such as the United States. Companies regularly choose cheap, 
low income areas to set up their waste disposal facilities and then fail to properly safeguard 
against dangers to the surrounding communities. Multiple arrests occurred following the Vale 
dam collapse because of the possibility of criminally poor maintenance of the dams and 
disregard of warning signs that the dam was unsafe. Vale knew about the dangerously unstable 
condition of the dam back in October of 2018, almost three months prior to the collapse. Despite 
knowing that the dam’s chance of collapse was twice the maximum risk the company’s own 
guidelines allowed, the company neglected to take action. 
Under Article XIX of the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (ADRIP), 
indigenous persons have a right to live in healthy environments. This includes the right to 
manage their lands in a sustainable way and to protect their lands from the deposit of harmful 
substances while placing a requirement on states that they “shall establish and implement 
assistance programs for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without 
discrimination.” In addition, the right to a healthy environment is further guaranteed by Article 
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11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights, which Brazil has 
ratified. For years, Brazil’s indigenous populations have protested the placement of dams on and 
near their lands. These efforts have been thwarted by companies who develop the dams despite 
protest and simply compensate indigenous communities after the damage is already done. The 
most recent dam collapse and subsequent awareness of the instability of hundreds of other dams 
throughout Brazil proves that there are some consequences of developing on or near indigenous 
lands which cannot be resolved with a check. 
The new Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, has already taken steps to diminish tribal rights in 
Brazil. President Bolsonaro transferred the power to designate indigenous lands to the Ministry 
of Agriculture at the beginning of January 2019 just after dismantling Brazil’s bureau of 
indigenous affairs. Researchers claim that these actions potentially foreshadow the complete 
annihilation of whole indigenous tribes in Brazil. These movements of the Brazilian government, 
coupled with the recent catastrophe of the Vale dam collapse could quickly lead to more than just 
a couple Vale executives facing jail time. Brazil owes a duty to its indigenous people to reinstate 















The Decline of Indigenous Legal Protections 
in Guatemala 
 
April 22, 2019 
by Mary Kate O’Connell 
 
In mid-January, thousands of indigenous Guatemalan citizens took to the streets to protest the 
country’s recent actions to remove human rights protections for the indigenous community. Over 
the past year, Guatemala’s president, Jimmy Morales, made tactical efforts to discredit 
the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). Such efforts can be 
attributed to the UN-backed international institution’s investigations against President Morales 
and his family for suspected corruption. On January 7 2019, President Morales expelled CICIG, 
a move that garnered international attention for the potential negative effect on the capacity  of 
Guatemala’s judicial system to pursue justice for violations of indigenous human rights. On 
January 17, 2019, soon after Morales expelled CICIG, the Guatemalan Congress announced an 
amendment to The National Reconciliation Law. If approved, this law would grant amnesty to 
those convicted of crimes against humanity in connection with Guatemala’s thirty-six-year civil 
war, the victims of which predominantly belonged to the indigenous community. These recent 
moves by the Guatemalan government have come after 200 attacks against indigenous human 
rights defenders were reported in 2018, a number that is likely to be higher in 2019 given these 
new changes to institutional protections for rule of law. Both the expulsion of CICIG and the 
amendment to the National Reconciliation Law pose significant risks to the country’s obligations 
to protect indigenous peoples from impunity. 
Guatemala’s thirty-six -year civil war, which occurred from 1960-1996, claimed the lives of 
more than 200,000 Guatemalans, the majority of whom belonged to the country’s indigenous 
Mayan community. The war began as a conflict between a military-controlled government 
against a left-wing insurgency and largely occurred in the Guatemalan countryside and 
mountainous areas, where the population was primarily Mayan. As a result, the government 
brutally attacked and burnt down many Mayan villages entirely to avoid the guerilla insurgency 
from gaining more traction. In 1999, a United Nations (“UN”) truth commission set up as part of 
Guatemala’s supervised peace accords released a monumental report. The report revealed that 
the Guatemalan government was culpable for more than ninety percent of the 42,000 human 
rights violations that occurred during the civil war.  The report further concluded that the Mayan 
community suffered the most from the civil war, and that the war consisted of “aggressive, racist, 
and extremely cruel violations that resulted in the massive extermination of defenseless Mayan 
communities.” 
Following the 1996 peace accords, Guatemala enacted The National Reconciliation Law. In its 
original form, this law was used by Guatemalan national courts to prosecute and convict leaders 
of the Guatemalan government who partook in the violence during the civil war that resulted in 
near-genocide of the Mayan community. The National Reconciliation Law, until recently, had 
been heralded by the international community as a legal model of how to fight institutional 
impunity for serious human rights violations. In 2013, Guatemala became the first country to 
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convict a former dictator of genocide when The National Reconciliation Law was used to 
convict Efrain Rios Montt. Rios Montt took control of Guatemala through leading a military 
coup in 1982 and directed and oversaw the killings, kidnappings, torture, and disappearance of 
hundreds of thousands, mainly Mayan, Guatemalan citizens. During his trial, he was found 
responsible for, among other acts, the massacres in 15 Ixil Mayan villages, which resulted in the 
killing of over 1,771 unarmed women, men, and children. In November 2018, The National 
Reconciliation Law was used to prosecute and convict Santos Lopez Alonso, a former 
Guatemalan soldier. He was convicted for his involvement in the Dos Erres Massacre of 1982, in 
which 200 people were killed in the primarily Mayan village of Dos Erres. 
Now, the amendment to The National Reconciliation Law, if adopted, would conflict with 
international obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights, which limits 
adoption of amnesty for crimes against humanity. The amendment would within twenty-four 
hours result in the release and amnesty of dozens of former governmental officials and military 
leaders, who were convicted for forced disappearances, mass executions, rape, and genocide. 
The amendment would also immediately halt the ongoing investigations into the abuse and 
violence that occurred during the civil war. Michele Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, has referred to the possible consequence of this amendment as “complete 
impunity for all those involved in truly horrendous violations, including crimes against 
humanity.” This amendment to a law that fights impunity for human rights violations has the 
potential to cause retaliation against victims, witnesses, judges, organizations, and lawyers who 
helped convict the former government and military officials. However, as noted by High 
Commissioner Bachelet, international standards limit the adoption of amnesty for crimes against 
humanity, most notably the American Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by 
Guatemala in 1978. 
Efforts to restrict the ability of Guatemalan institutions such as CICIG to fight impunity have 
received international criticism from the UN for violating the state’s international obligation to 
protect the human rights of all citizens. The amendment to The National Reconciliation Law can 
be viewed as part of the Guatemalan government’s latest efforts to restrict the power of 
Guatemala’s institutions against corruption and impunity. One of these institutions is the 
International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG), which President Morales expelled from 
the country on January 7, 2019. CICIG was created and backed by the UN and the European 
Union and can be defined as a hybrid anti-corruption body that uses international investigators 
and national prosecutors to identify and prosecute criminal networks and corrupt government 
officials from the civil war. In November 2018, CICIG reported that it had worked with 
Guatemala’s Attorney General to prosecute more than 680 people and to gain convictions for 
310 cases involving influence peddling and illegal campaign financing. Although President 
Morales was elected in part because of his anti-corruption platform with the campaign slogan 
“Neither corrupt nor thief,” he stopped supporting CICIG’s anti-corruption efforts beginning in 
2017 when CICIG implicated him and his political part for campaign finance violations. Most 
recently, CICIG opened an investigation into President Morales and his brother on corruption 
charges, leading President Morales to banish CICIG’s commissioner from Guatemala, refuse to 
renew CICIG’s mandate, and expel CICIG in its entirety in January. 
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Some have referred to President Morales’ expulsion of CICIG as part of his slow-motion coup to 
gain a military stronghold in the country similar to that which existed during the civil war. 
However, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court has limited President Morales’ power and has 
issued a provisional injunction reversing CICIG’s expulsion for unconstitutionality since the 
creation of CICIG was ratified by Guatemala’s congress. Additionally, the UN deemed the 
expulsion impermissible and confirmed that CICIG would continue its work in Guatemala. 
By expelling CICIG and proposing an amendment to The National Reconciliation Law, the 
Guatemalan government, led by President Morales, is allowing the state to fall back on its 
obligation under the American Convention on Human Rights to protect all citizens – including 
indigenous peoples – from impunity and violence. If President Morales continues to attack 
CICIG and the amnesty legislation passes congress, the indigenous community in Guatemala 
will face a heightened risk of violence reminiscent of the early years of the horrific civil war.  To 
avoid the country falling into state-led violence again, the international community, including the 
UN and the Organization of American States should continue to monitor the constitutionality of 
President Morales’ actions and continue to support the efforts and existence of the Truth 










Mistreatment in Nursing Homes through 
Antipsychotics  
May 3, 2019 
By Liz Leman 
 
All over the United States nursing homes are trying to control seniors by putting them on 
antipsychotic drugs without any authorization.  This practice, unsurprisingly, makes the nurses’ 
job more convenient because the seniors’ become lethargic (at least). In addition to the legal and 
moral issues that stem from this misuse of drugs, the practice also carries disastrous health 
repercussions for residents. According to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
antipsychotic drugs are meant to treat psychiatric conditions.  Nurses, however, are 
administering antipsychotic drugs to seniors – not for its intended purpose – but as an 
unwarranted sedative for residents with dementia.  The FDA requires manufacturers to label 
antipsychotic drugs with the strongest “black box” warning about the risks they pose to people 
with dementia because these drugs nearly double the risk of death for residents.  One director of 
nursing stated that seeing the senior decline on an antipsychotic is “sadder than watching 
someone with dementia decline.” This inhumane phenomenon is so widespread that, according 
to a report by the Human Rights Watch, every week over 179,000 residents who do not have 
diagnoses requiring antipsychotic drugs are still given them.  This practice reaches beyond 
creating irreversible health repercussions for seniors.  
 
Unnecessarily putting peoples’ parents, grandparents, etc. on drugs without authorization from 
the senior or his/her family also violates human rights norms. This widespread phenomenon 
blatantly violates the 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act, which provides a Bill of Rights to each 
resident to protect rights and ensure a level of care.  The Act is supposed to ensure that nursing 
home residents a quality of care “that will result in their achieving or maintaining their ‘highest 
practicable’ physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being.”  Administering antipsychotic drugs 
to residents with dementia harnesses the exact opposite effect.  Instead of maintaining the 
“highest practicable” physical, mental, and psychosocial well-being, this practice increases the 
speed of these seniors’ health deterioration. Under this act, the residents have a right to be “fully 
informed in advance about care and treatment.”  The residents are administered these drugs, 
however, without adequate information for them or a family member to properly consent nor the 
opportunity to object.  For example, a resident of a Texas nursing home explained that she had 
no idea she was being given antipsychotic drugs because “they crush it and put it in baby food, 
so you don’t know what you’re getting fed.” The 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act also provides 
that the residents’ care is free from improper medical treatment.   
 
Abusing antipsychotic drugs, however, by putting lives at danger, is worse than improper 
medical treatment.  This treatment is inhumane. While there are federal regulations in place to 
bar the use of drugs without adequate indication for use, there should be stronger enforcement in 
connection to nursing homes.  One example of an initiative that is already put in place is the 
National Partnership to Improve Dementia Care in Nursing Homes by the Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services.  The issue remains prevalent, however. One potential reason for the 
20
continuation of unauthorized administration of antipsychotic drugs in nursing homes is because 
initiatives focus too much on the drugs, and less on the root of the problem, the rights of the 
residents.  The 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act focuses on the rights of the residents, but the 
value of this act depends on the effectiveness of its enforcement.  Nursing home staff should be 
required to learn its principles.  Additionally, the US government should work further to enforce 
residents’ rights as per the 1987 Nursing Home Reform Act and hold nursing facilities 
accountable for their misconduct. 
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A Sacrifice Zone: Environmental Justice in 
Chile  
August 20, 2019 
by Valentina Capotosto 
In April 2019, the Supreme Court of Chile decided a landmark case in which the court called for 
greater enforcement of citizens’ environmental rights. The case was brought after two pollution 
incidents exposed 200 residents of Quintero and Puchuncaví to toxic pollutants in 2018. Quintero 
and Puchuncavἱ make up one of four “sacrifice zones”—communities plagued by immense 
industrial pollution justified by the promise of economic development. Unlimited industrial 
development, heavy waste production, and a lack of oversight or mitigation over the past fifty 
years have led to the contamination of the air, soil, and water in these communities. 
Residents of Quintero and Puchuncaví have battled for their environmental rights for years. In 
2011 media attention and outrage garnered over the poisioning of thirty-three school children at 
La Greda school. The Chilean Center for Investigative Journalism and Information (CIPER) 
linked the pollutants to a state-run mining company, Codelco. Still, insufficient regulations and 
industrial growth persisted despite the contamination event at La Greda school. Today, these 
communities are described as a “reservoir of chemical waste,” a dystopia where the air is heavy 
and black sticky dust settles on every surface. 
The case decided this year may be the first legal victory for environmental justice in Quintero 
and Puchuncaví after half a century of unfettered industrial growth and environmental 
degradation. The plaintiffs included representatives from the National Institute for Human 
Rights, Greenpeace, and the Municipalities of Quintero and Puchuncavἱ. In the opinion, the 
Chilean Supreme Court criticized government agencies such as the Ministry of the Environment, 
Ministry of Health, Valparaiso’s Regional Ministry of Health, and the Office of National 
Emergency for systematic negligence. The opinion highlighted the state’s failure to mitigate 
pollution, monitor public health, comply with the national emergency plan, and adhere to 
international conventions. The court, in condemning responsible state actors, quoted Article 1, 
Paragraph 4 of Chile’s Constitution, holding that the duty of the State includes safeguarding 
national security, providing protection for families, and ensuring everyone has the right to 
participate in national life with equal opportunity. 
One important takeaway from this case is that international standards matter in determining the 
responsibilities of state actors to enforce environmental rights. In the decision, the court 
condemned the Ministry of the Environment for failing to comply with international 
environmental conventions such as the Montreal Protocol, the Stockholm Convention, and the 
Basel Convention. The Basel Convention, for example, sets environmental standards for 
hazardous waste disposal. Insufficient state oversight of industrial waste practices has led to 
events such as the pollution incident at the La Greda school in 2011 and the contamination of 
Quintero Bay which violate standards for protecting human health and the environment agreed to 
in the convention. 
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 The decision has been praised by Human Rights Watch who contributed to an Amicus Brief 
(“HRW Brief”) for the case. The HRW Brief urged the court to consider international law and 
international standards in enforcing environmental rights. It advised the court to use the 2018 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Environment’s Framework Principles (“Framework 
Principles”) as a guide for enforcing environmental rights, as embodied in Article 19(8) of 
Chile's Constitution, which establishes citizens’ right to an environment free from contamination. 
The Framework Principles act as an interpretive guide for domestic enforcement of 
environmental rights and how states can be held accountable for violations of environmental 
rights. Key Framework Principles mentioned in the HRW Brief include requiring assessments of 
environmental impact, maintaining substantive environmental standards, and having affordable, 
effective, and timely public access to environmental information. 
The Chilean Supreme Court’s enforcement of environmental rights through domestic law could 
be an important mechanism for environmental justice within Chile as well as internationally. 
Future domestic court decisions could establish affirmative responsibilities for state actors to 
uphold constitutionally protected environmental rights and international environmental 
conventions. For example, the HRW Brief mentioned a case decided by the Supreme Court in 
Argentina requiring the government to create mechanisms for access to information, emergency 
plans, international compliance, and enforcement oversight. Other trends mentioned in the HRW 
Brief include cases enforcing the human right to a healthy environment from the United 
Kingdom, France, and Germany. 
While this case brings residents of Quintero and Puchuncaví one step closer to achieving 
environmental justice, it will likely take much more time to unravel the effects of severe 
industrial pollution accumulated over the last fifty years. Yet, this decision furthers a new 
potential trend for more courts to hold government actors accountable for upholding 
environmental rights. Marcos Orellana, Director for the Environment and Human Rights 
Division of Human Rights Watch, wrote an article describing the case as a “cause for hope that 
other courts around the world may find a basis in domestic law to uphold the right to a healthy 
environment.” 
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